Household management has been identified as the last barrier to genderegalitarian marriages (Zimmerman, Haddock, Ziemba, & Rust, 2001 ), but the management work of running a household is the least researched aspect in the allocation of household labor. Essential planning, coordinating, and budgeting take time and effort above and beyond the physical demands of household work. Little is known, however, about what determines who does household management tasks or how executive activities articulate with other housework. With data from the 2002 Gender and Family module of the International Social Survey Program, this article addresses issues of household management in cross-national context.
Motivating the article are power, social exchange, and dependency theories, which have been previously employed in studying the allocation of housework (Baxter & Kane, 1995; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Brines, 1994) . These theories assume that the dominant partner will get his or her way in bargaining-avoiding domestic activities that are unpleasant by off-loading them on the subordinate partner. Research on housework offers some empirical support for these theories (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Fuwa, 2004; Ishii-Kuntz & Coltrane, 1992) . If household management, like housework, is regarded as unpleasant (i.e., boring, tiring, unrewarding), then we would expect the logic of bargaining theories to hold for the division of household management, too. Alternatively, managing the household may validate gender identity or confer coveted control and authority over the household and its members. Rather than avoiding this activity, individuals may want to be the one who manages the household. Depending on how domestic management tasks are evaluated, measures of a partner's relative power and resources could be either positively or negatively associated with being the household manager. Also based on how management is viewed, being the household manager might be positively or negatively associated with doing the housework. Of course, how interested a partner is in taking charge of the household may vary by gender.
Although we lack direct measures on subjective opinions of housework and household management, reports on who decides about children, leisure, and purchases permit us to address an important research question: Do partners' relative resources explain how household management responsibilities are allocated? Consistent with power, exchange, and dependency theories, we find the wife's income advantage is associated with her greater control over household decision making-at least according to women's reports. Despite this evidence that women's resources translate into the wife's decision-making authority, most married people opt for shared decision making on household matters. Cooperative management, not household management tasks. In another study, mothers and fathers filled out a checklist of jobs that they did around the home, including not only housework and child care per se but also household management (e.g., making medical appointments, deciding purchases, planning celebrations, setting standards) and child care management (e.g., learning about child care, planning outings for the child, getting a child's things ready for the next day) (Meier, McNaughton-Cassill, & Lynch, 2006) . Not only did mothers do more housework and child care than fathers but also they did more of the management of housework and child care. When children have split custody arrangements, the mothers are the ones to keep track of the children's doctor appointments (Maccoby & Mnookin, 1992) . New mothers, as compared with fathers, report greater mental involvement; they worry more-not only about child care but also about household labor (Wicki, 1999) . Indicative of mothers' greater mental engagement, mothers' reports of day-to-day family life line up more closely with researchers' observations than do fathers' (Lareau, 2003) .
In their classic study of marital power, Blood and Wolfe (1960) addressed household management by asking who made major household decisions. In 56% of couples, the husband always decided which car to buy. In 41% of marriages, the wife always decided how much to spend on food. In many matters-which house to take (58%), where to go on vacation (68%), whether to purchase life insurance (41%), which doctor to go to (45%)-the most popular response was "husband and wife exactly the same." Mederer (1993) reported that women took charge of most household management, but arranging for home repairs still fell to men and money decisions were usually described as shared. When it comes to money management, American couples prefer the shared governance of pooled incomes (Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Treas, 1993) , but Vogler (2005) cautions that income pooling, which seems consistent with an egalitarian ideology, often obscures one partner's disproportionate control.
Child rearing is one area where women may have the final say. Most cultures assume there is a special relationship between mothers and children (Charles & Cech, 2009) . Consistent with the cultural ideology prescribing "intensive mothering" roles (Hays, 1996) , American women not only do more child care but also more of the so-called mental (i.e., managerial) aspects of baby care than do fathers (Walzer, 1996) . In fact, mothers actively manage father-child relationships (e.g., planning their joint activities, applauding father's engagement with the youngster, organizing the family calendar) (Seery & Crowley, 2000) . Fathers may not welcome child management duties:
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Their marital satisfaction, although higher when they do more hands-on child care, is lower when they are responsible for more management (Meier et al., 2006) .
Comparing Household Management and Housework
Despite the gender stereotyping of at least some tasks and their common locus in the home, management does not seem to elicit the same negative feelings as housework. Doing housework has some rewards-such as demonstrating caring for other household members (DeVault, 1991; Sanchez & Kane, 1996) , appreciating a job well done (Pittman, Teng, Kerpelman, & Solheim, 1999) , and affirming gender identity (Berk, 1985; West & Zimmerman, 1987) . Housework, however, is often regarded negatively. It is seen as boring, unpleasant, and tiring labor (Bianchi et al., 2000) . Housework is not as enjoyable as a paid job (Juster, 1985) . In 1995, only 27% of American women said they really enjoyed housework, and only 16% described it as a completely satisfying activity (Robinson & Milkie, 1998) . Female university employees liked housework less than their male counterparts and reported greater conflict, guilt, and resentment over housework (Ogletree, Worthen, Turner, & Vickers, 2006) .
Although evidence is largely indirect, managerial responsibilities do not seem to be a big source of dissatisfaction. The allocation of housework tasks is a stronger predictor of wives' perceptions of fairness than is the division of household management; only housework is associated with marital conflict (Mederer, 1993) . That women value having managerial prerogatives is seen in studies of maternal gatekeeping. By invoking high housekeeping standards and feelings of personal responsibility for the home, women discourage their husband's participation in the household (Allen & Hawkins, 1999) . In a study of lesbians' stepfamilies, where male privilege does not factor into couple dynamics, biological mothers do more of the housework and child care, because they value having the say in how money is spent and children are raised (Moore, 2008) . For purchases, the more involved partner, the one viewing the decision as more important, has greater influence over the outcome (Reiss & Webster, 2004) . Although housework may be drudgery to be off-loaded on a partner, household management may be coveted, because it translates into desired power over the household and its members.
Household Management, Power, and Bargaining
Power, social exchange, and dependency theories (Baxter & Kane, 1995; Blau, 1964; Blood & Wolfe, 1960; Brines, 1994) predict that domestic arrangements will conform to the preferences of the dominant partner. The partner who wields the greater power and who is less dependent on the relationship will call the shots. Emphasizing reciprocity in relationships, social exchange theory points out that the subordinate partner with fewer valued resources to exchange will reciprocate by deferring to the dominant partner (Blau, 1964) . To explain why domestic matters fall to women, dependency theory argues that wives having limited employment prospects strike a marital bargain to do housework in exchange for economic support from their husband (Acker, 1988) .
Following power, exchange, and dependency theories, studies of housework assume a bargaining dynamic. The distribution of housework is the "outcome of negotiations between husbands and wives who use whatever valued resources they can to strike the best deal in behalf of self-interest" (Brines, 1993, p. 307) . The partner who has relatively more resources has the upper hand in the negotiations to opt out of unpleasant chores. Education, income, employment, or even attractiveness to potential partners all can constitute a resource advantage. Historically, men have had the advantage (at least in the labor market). Given an integrated system of gender inequality, the resources that women derive from working tend to be discounted in the home vis-à-vis men's (Blumberg, 1984) , particularly in less gender-egalitarian societies (Fuwa, 2004) .
Relative incomes of husband and wife are linked to male participation in housework (Bianchi et al., 2000; Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Fuwa, 2004; Greenstein, 2000) . Men do less housework and women do more when the wife contributes less money than the husband to the household. Some studies report that men who are outearned by their wives do less, not more, housework (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003; Brines, 1994) , a pattern attributed to men "doing gender" or repairing a gender norm transgression (Brines, 1993; Greenstein, 2000) . Research on housework and relative incomes has been criticized for neglecting absolute income levels (Gupta, 2006 (Gupta, , 2007 , if only because couples with higher incomes can hire others to do housework (Treas & de Ruijter, 2008) . Although household management is less readily outsourced than housework, relative resources still need to be gauged against total family income. Management is a burden, not a privilege, when there is not enough money to make ends meet (Kenney, 2006; Paul, 1980; Vogler, 2005) . Decision making is more fun when money is no object.
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For household management, the results on bargaining are mixed. Challenging the idea that management is unwanted, men are more likely to manage (i.e., control) household money when their wives contribute relatively less income (Kenney, 2006) . Research on purchasing decisions also points to relative resource explanations (Reiss & Webster, 2004) . Equal incomes, however, are no guarantee of shared money management (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003) . Reporting that household management, like housework, is viewed negatively, another study found a significant positive association between doing housework tasks and being responsible for household management (Meier et al., 2006) . The study focused not on budgetary control but on the less rewarding managerial tasks that are the necessary precursors to physical work (e.g., planning meals, arranging car repairs, planning celebrations).
Following the relative resources argument, the relationship of housework and household management will depend on whether management is viewed as a desirable activity or not. If household management is seen as unpleasant, it will be off-loaded on the less powerful partner in the same way that housework often falls to the partner with little income. If household management is a seen as a pleasant activity or confers benefits such as valued control over decision making, we would expect the more powerful partner to monopolize the managerial work, even as he or she evades the unpleasant physical chores. Not all management tasks may be equally coveted, at least equally by men and women. Given women's traditional responsibilities for family and household, they may be more inclined than men to leverage resource advantages to take valued control of household decision making.
This implies two sets of alternative gender-neutral hypotheses and two gendered hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: The partner with greater relative income will have more household management responsibility. Hypothesis 1b: The partner with greater relative income will have less household management responsibility. Hypothesis 2a: The less housework done by a partner, the less household management the partner will do. Hypothesis 2b: The more housework done by a partner, the less household management the partner will do. Hypothesis 3a: The wife with greater relative income will do more household management. Hypothesis 3b: The wife with greater relative income will do less household management.
Division of Household Labor: Further Considerations
Other factors associated with the division of housework can inform the study of household management (Coltrane, 2000; Shelton & John, 1996) . Time availability (Shelton & John, 1996) argues that employment competes with housework for time. The more hours the husband works, the less work he does around the house; the more hours the wife works for pay, the less housework she does and the more the husband has to take on (Treas, 2008) . Following demand arguments, bigger homes generate more housework (van der Lippe, Tijdens, & de Ruijter, 2004) . So do children, but the pressure of parenting creates more work for the mother than the father (Baxter, Hewitt, & Haynes, 2008) . How couples divide the housework, however, depends on more than purely rational calculations. Couples with more gender-egalitarian attitudes adopt more egalitarian housework arrangements (Coltrane, 2000) . Gender attitudes also influence purchasing decisions (Reiss & Webster, 2004) . More education disposes individuals to a more equal allocation of the chores (Coltrane, 2000) . Age is negatively associated with the husband's participation in housework, which may reflect differences between recent liberal cohorts and earlier ones with more traditional gender views. Higher household incomes not only permit couples to hire others to do the housework (Treas & de Ruijter, 2008) but also mean fewer budget constraints, making household decision making more pleasurable and less of a burden (Kenney, 2006; Vogler, 2005) .
Cross-National Perspectives
Country characteristics predict husband's housework share, even controlling for individual-level factors (Treas & Drobnič, 2010 ). Men's participation in household labor is associated with societal empowerment of women (Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Geist, 2005) , female employment levels (Hook, 2006) , public child care policies (Fuwa & Cohen, 2007) , the cultural value placed on companionate marriage (Yodanis, 2010) , and other factors. Following Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of national policy approaches, how housework is divided differs for different capitalist welfare regimes. In "conservative" regimes such as Germany and Austria, government tax, employment, and welfare policies support male breadwinner-female homemaker arrangements, and men do relatively less housework (Fuwa, 2004; Geist, 2005) . The Nordic "social democracies"-having gender-egalitarian policies-display the greatest gender parity in housework (Fuwa, 2004) .
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Men's housework share falls somewhere in between for the "liberal" countries (e.g., the United States and Great Britain), which are characterized by market-oriented, noninterventionist social policies. Elsewhere, men perform more housework in the postsocialist Eastern and Central European states, perhaps as a legacy of women's universal employment under socialism. Southern Europe favors full-time homemaking for married women, reflecting a lack of part-time jobs (Blossfeld & Hakim, 1997) . Latin American values support traditional gender roles in the family, despite developments that have increased female employment (Parrado & Zenteno, 2001) . As for household management, shared money management is found for countries where dual-earner couples are more common (Yodanis & Lauer, 2007b) and where societal inequality is low (Yodanis & Lauer, 2007a) . Given their egalitarian values, we expect the Nordic social democracies to be the most inclined to shared household management. Southern Europeans and Latin Americans subscribe to more traditional gender roles (Nordenmark, 2004; Strickney & Konrad, 2007) . Patriarchal values imply male control of the household, but strict gender specialization may leave household management in women's hands. Although many macro-level variables may contribute to household management practices, theoretical interests lead us to focus on egalitarian gender ideology and women's employment. We hypothesize that countries with more liberal/egalitarian gender ideologies and higher female employment levels will favor shared over solo decision making; countries with conservative gender ideologies and low levels of female employment will favor management by the husband (or perhaps wife) over shared management.
Data and Method
This study draws on data from the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Collected by independent research organizations, the data are based on representative samples from 31 populations: Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden (social democratic); Austria, Flanders, France, West Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, and Switzerland (conservative); Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand, and United States (liberal); Cyprus, Portugal, and Spain (Southern European); Bulgaria, Czech Republic, East Germany, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, and Slovenia (postsocialist); and Brazil, Chile, and Mexico (Latin American). Analysis focuses on heterosexuals, 18 to 65 years, who were married with children younger than 18 years in the household. Sample size for analysis, ranging from 51 in Germany to 406 in France, totals 6,871.
Three dependent measures of household management responsibilities are based on items asking the following: (a) Who makes/made the decisions about how to bring up your children? (b) Who has the final say in choosing shared weekend activities? (c) Who has the final say in buying major things for the home? Responses were recoded to "mostly the wife," "mostly the husband," and other. The composite "other" category is dominated by the "we decide together" response, followed by "sometimes me, sometimes my partner" and the generally less than 1% indicating "someone else." We refer to it as "shared."
For independent variables, the partner's relative resources measure comes from an ISSP item that asked whether the wife's income is higher, the partners have the same income, or the husband's income is higher (the reference category). The household division of labor is the percentage of total (husband's plus wife's) housework hours weekly that are done by the male partner. The wording excludes child care and leisure activities. From the literature on the division of housework, control variables include respondent's age as well as education measured by six categories ranging from no formal education (0) to university education (5). Respondent's and spouse's numbers of paid work hours control for each partner's time available to do housework. Family income was harmonized by combining categorical data for each country into six groups. The number of children gauges the demand for household labor; like the number of adults in the household, this variable indicates household complexity and management demands. Respondent's liberal gender attitudes (α = .73) come from a factor analysis of Likert-type items on agreement or disagreement with five statements: (a) A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works; (b) Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job; (c) A job is all right, but what most women really want is a home and children; (d) Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay; (e) A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is look after the home and family. We identify six groupings of countries: Esping-Andersen's (1990) familiar typology of capitalist welfare regimes (liberal, conservative, and social democratic) as described above, as well as Southern European, postsocialist, and Latin American categories. Our aim is to describe cross-national differences, not to theorize country typologies, which generate considerable debate (Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996; Korpi & Palme, 1998; Lewis, 1992) . Two macro-level variables are considered-the country-specific mean for the ISSP gender liberalism measure and the percentage of women, aged 25 to 54 years, in the labor force circa 2002, as based on data from the International Labour Organization and several national statistical offices (International Labour Organization, 2009 ). For male and female respondents separately, the descriptive statistics on the independent variables are shown in Table 1 . Multilevel, multinomial modeling is used to estimate the effects of countrylevel and individual-level predictors on household management variables. Multilevel modeling controls for the fact that respondents clustered within countries do not satisfy the "independence of observations" assumption (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) . We analyze whether the division of household management is related to (a) relative resources and other individual-level factors and (b) country-level predictors including country types, female labor force participation rate, and societal gender ideology. The three country-level predictors are presented in separate models. Multinomial models simultaneously estimate the likelihoods of self-versus-other and partner-versus-other management arrangements.
The individual-level models are as follows: is the log-odds of respondent i reporting self to make decisions in country j (relative to other, i.e., shared, decision making) and β kj(1) X kij are individual-level independent variables for the log-odds of reporting self as decision maker, including husband's percentage of housework; the respondent's age, highest degree, and weekly work hours; spouse's weekly work hours; partners' relative incomes; total family income; the numbers of children and adults in household; and gender attitude liberalism. η 2ij is the logodds of reporting the partner to manage housework (relative to other) in country j and β kj(2) X kij are individual-level independent variables. Each respondent's log-odds are equal to his or her country-specific intercept.
The country-level equation predicts the log odds of reporting self (β 0j (1) ) or partner versus other (β 0j (2) ) as a function of country-level predictors (including country types, the female labor force participation rate, and liberal gender ideology) with all individual-level characteristics fixed. The equation takes the following form: is the country-level log-odds of reporting self to take charge of decisions, γ 0k(1) X kj represents a country-level predictor. For country categories, Nordic social democracies are the omitted reference category. γ 00 (2) is the log-odds of reporting that the partner manages the household, and u 0j (1) and u 0j (2) are random effects at the country level for reporting self-versus-other or reporting partner-versus-other arrangements, respectively. Except for dummy variables, all variables are centered at their grand means. Therefore, the country-level intercept reflects the change in the log-odds of reporting self (or partner) versus other for a respondent residing in a social democratic country, having the husband with higher income than the wife, and being average on other characteristics.
Results
For female and male respondents, respectively, Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of management responsibilities. For each of the three management domains, about three fourths of married men and women report "other," largely shared, decision making. For the minority saying that one or the other partner takes charge, decision making about the children shows the greatest gender specialization. Fully 23% of married women report making most upbringing decisions, as opposed to only 2% who credit mostly the husband. For choosing shared weekend activities and deciding major purchases, the split between respondent and spouse is more even. On all three decision-making variables, men are more likely to perceive sharing, whereas women emphasize their own disproportionate responsibility.
Results for Married Women
Next, multilevel multinomial models relate each of the management tasks to individual-level variables and country categories. children's upbringing in the first column. The top panel shows the results for decisions made mostly by the wife as opposed to other/shared decision making (given the spouse-vs.-shared option, which is estimated jointly). Net of family income, the wife is more likely to take charge of decisions about the children when she makes more money than her husband, as opposed to when she makes less (the omitted reference category). Equal incomes are not significantly different (p < .05) from the husband having the higher income. All things considered, when the husband does a larger share of housework, the wife is less likely to make decisions about children alone rather than jointly. Wife's age and education, as well as her husband's work hours, are all positively associated with the likelihood that she manages the children by herself. Other variables are not statistically significant. Only formerly socialist states differ significantly from Nordic social democracies, having wives who are more likely to make decisions on children by themselves as opposed to jointly with the husband. The bottom panel shows the likelihood that the husband decides about the children rather than sharing responsibility, given the wife-versus-shared option. Considering how rarely men take sole charge of the children's management, it is not surprising that neither the partners' relative resources nor the husband's housework share are significantly associated with his taking on this responsibility. Only the wife's age is significantly (and positively) associated with the husband managing the children's upbringing alone. Age may be a proxy for having older children whose needs map to the father's parenting competencies. Being much more likely to favor management by the husband over management by the couple, only Latin Americans differ significantly from persons in Nordic social democracies. For weekend activities, as for children, wives who make more money than husbands are apt to take charge as opposed to sharing. Again, her decision making is negatively related to her husband's housework share. Wife's age and number of adults also raise the odds of her making decisions alone. There are no significant country differences. For husband-versus-shared decision making, neither relative income nor husband's housework share is statistically significant. Perhaps because of the management complexity of larger households, additional adults raise the likelihood that the husband decides weekend activities instead of sharing decision making. The wife's weekly work hours are negatively related to his control. Unlike decisions about children, weekend plans are related to the wife's gender attitudes: The husband is less likely to take control versus share when the wife has liberal views. Compared with Nordic social democracies, the husbands in Southern Europe and especially Latin America are significantly more likely to decide alone, rather than jointly. For the wife's solo decision making, major purchases also show a positive association with the wife's higher relative income, as well as a negative association with husband's housework. Better educated wives are less likely to take charge and more likely to make decisions jointly, but other variables, including country categories, are nonsignificant. The husband-versus-joint decision-making choice is not significantly associated with relative income, but it is negatively related to the husband's housework share and to the wife's liberal attitudes. Other variables are not statistically significant. Table 3 presents the multilevel multinomial results for male respondents, beginning with decisions about the children's upbringing. Relative incomes are not significantly associated with the husband taking charge rather than sharing responsibility. He is somewhat more likely to be the decision maker when he does a larger portion of the housework, suggesting that efficient coordination, rather than relative resources, influences household management. Likely reflecting cohort differences, age is negatively associated with the husband managing the children alone. So are his liberal gender attitudes. More adults equate to his solo management of children, but other independent variables are not statistically significant. Being more likely to favor maledominated over shared decision making, only Southern Europe and Latin America differ significantly from Nordic social democracies. For children, no variables are statistically significant for wife-versus-shared decisions.
Results for Married Men
For weekend activities, relative resources are not statistically significant. Husband's housework share, family income, and his liberal gender attitudes are linked to a lower probability that he alone decides on the weekend activities. Southern European and Latin American countries are significantly more likely than the social democratic ones to prefer the husband's decision making over the couple's. Men's liberal gender attitudes are associated with a lower likelihood of the wife taking charge of the weekend plans and a higher likelihood of sharing.
As for major purchases, male respondents indicate that the husband is less likely to take charge when the partners have equal incomes (as opposed to the husband earning more). Although his control over purchases is negatively associated with his liberal gender attitudes, it is positively related to higher family income, that is, to situations in which money management is less burdensome and more enjoyable. There are no significant differences between countries. No variables are significantly associated with the wife's controlling purchases rather than sharing this decision making. 
Country-Level Factors
At least for children and for weekend activities, the results pointed to country differences in the partners' decision making. Compared with the egalitarian Nordic social democracies, Latin American and Southern European countries are associated with higher odds of the husband taking charge rather than sharing household management decisions with his wife. Although descriptively informative, broad country categories do not say much about the country characteristics that support the different models of decision making. Table 4 reports the results for two country-level variables, female labor force participation and liberal gender ideology. First, controlling for individual-level variables, countries subscribing to a more liberal gender ideology are, as expected, those where decisions are shared instead of being made by one or the other partner. Men and women generally agree that gender-egalitarian views deter male over joint decisions (although country ideology is not statistically significant for major purchases). According to women, even net of relative resources, joint decision making is favored over the wife's sole control in more gender-egalitarian countries, but no significant difference is found for men's reports. In countries with liberal gender beliefs, husbands may disavow their own solo decision making, but they are not more likely than their counterparts elsewhere to report that joint decision making is preferred to the wife's control.
Second, high female labor force participation levels are predictably associated with shared household management over solo decision making. Wives' and husbands' reports agree that husbands are less likely to take charge of decisions where female employment is high. Female labor force participation levels, however, are not associated with wives' reports of whether they make the decisions alone or together with the husband. Nor does the country's female employment rate matter for the husband's reports on the wife's solo or joint management role with respect to children. 
Conclusion and Discussion
Building on research on how couples divide the physical housework, this article addresses a little-studied topic-the allocation of the essential social and mental labor of household management. The article makes four contributions. First, it demonstrates cross-nationally that most management involves shared decision making, rather than individual control. Second, consistent with a gender-specific relative resource hypothesis that recognizes women's bigger stake in household management, it shows that women, not men, marshal an income advantage to take charge of household decision making. Third, it shows that husband's participation in housework is linked to shared management, not to unilateral decision making by one or the other partner. Fourth, all things considered, it finds that shared decision making is characteristic of countries with higher rates of female employment and more egalitarian gender ideologies. The analysis was motivated by the logic of marital power and bargaining. If management activities are regarded as undesirable, the more powerful partner will off-load unwelcome management tasks on the weaker partner, just as unpleasant housekeeping chores fall to the partner with fewer resources. If household management is coveted as offering desired control, a resource advantage will be leveraged to gain control of management tasks while avoiding disagreeable housework; consequently, housework and household management will be negatively correlated. As we determined, net of family income, wives are more likely to monopolize than to share decision making when their income is higher than their husband's. Interestingly, women are no more likely to leverage on resources to take charge of decisions about children than about weekend activities or major purchases. Although these findings are consistent with relative resource expectations, male respondents do not perceive that wives capitalize on their greater relative resources to dominate decision making. Furthermore, neither men nor women report that an income advantage matters for whether the husband makes decisions alone or shares the management. For major purchases, men, if not women, indicate that equal incomes are linked to shared management-rather than to either male-or female-dominated decisions. The results contradict the gender-neutral relative resource hypothesis, which assumes that men and women will be equally motivated to mobilize resource advantages. Why might wives leverage on resources to monopolize household management? Traditionally responsible for family and household, women may feel a greater stake than men in household outcomes, or women may simply take on household management to validate a feminine identity by "doing gender." They may regard management activities as more appealing or less unpleasant than their husbands do.
Why might men emphasize shared responsibility? One interpretation is that wives' reports are more reliable than husbands'. Researchers studying family activities find that mothers' reports of everyday family life correspond more closely to the researchers' own observations than do fathers' reports (Lareau, 2003) . Alternately, the reports may be biased. Cross-nationally, both men and women provide similar accounts of women's housework hours, but they differ for men's housework. Men portray greater gender parity, reflecting either overreporting of housework by men or underreporting by women (Geist, 2010) . All things considered, men emphasize parity in household management. If power dynamics favor men, men may gain from a shared management interpretation that denies both their control and their wife's disproportionate responsibility for management tasks (Singh & Lindsay, 1996) . If power dynamics favor women in a violation of traditional gender norms, men may still prefer to obscure their lack of authority by invoking shared decision making. We cannot determine the source of reporting discrepancies, which argue for caution in interpreting results.
Contrary to expectations, husband's housework participation is not associated with either male-or female-dominated decision making. If anything, it is linked to shared household management. According to married women, the husband's greater participation in housework translates into her sharing, rather than monopolizing, decision making about children's upbringing, weekend activities, and major purchases. The more housework the husband does, the more inclined he is to joint rather than solo decision making on major purchases, too. Husbands' own reports do not reveal a correspondence between their housework and their decision making. They do agree that the wife is more likely to share decisions about weekend activities, if less likely to share decisions on children, when the husband does more housework. Although these findings do not conform to bargaining expectations, they suggest other possibilities. Grateful wives may be more willing to collaborate on household management with husbands who help out more around the house. Being intimately acquainted with household members and routines, the husband who carries out a good share of the housework may be indispensable to informed decision making and may be more invested in the outcomes. Although it is possible that some individual-level characteristics account for husbands' participation in both shared housework and shared management, controlling for liberal gender attitudes does not affect the association.
If resource-based bargaining does not dominate household management, it may be because shared management is the contemporary, egalitarian way to organize marriage. By interpreting what they do as sharing, couples display commitment to a companionate marriage model, rather than framing household management as the prize or penalty of self-interested struggles between husband and wife. Of course, a discourse of sharing also papers over discomforting inequalities that couples prefer not to acknowledge (Blumstein & Schwartz, 1983; Hertz, 1986; Singh & Lindsay, 1996) . That three quarters of respondents say they share the decision making suggests that household management, unlike housework, is not openly contested. Couples may see positive benefits in shared management. According to Vogler et al. (2008) , when husband or wife made autonomous instead of joint decisions, both partners were less satisfied with family life and life in general. Our country-level results underscore the importance of shared management. In countries with more liberal ideologies and higher rates of female labor force participation, couples favor joint management over decision making by one or the other partner. In these country contexts, shared decision making clearly wins out over patriarchal models that cede household control to the husband.
Of course, household management is diffuse, containing attractive elements of pragmatic control (getting to choose the home contractor) as well as more tedious tasks (researching contractors) and emotional labor (settling disputes with the contractor). If partners harbor ambivalence toward these responsibilities, rather than generally disdaining or craving managerial control, we would not expect bargaining explanations-which assume clear-cut preferences-to provide a consistent account of who does the work of household management. To the extent that household management is sought after, however, it is sought after by women, whose reports indicate that they leverage on their relative resources to gain sole control of decision making.
